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PREVIEW; Butte School District No. 1 v. C.S. and Stuart McCarvel.
Applying the Endrew F. Standard: ‘Appropriately Ambitious in
Light of the Child’s Circumstances’
Ally Seneczko
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is set to hear oral argument in
Butte School District No. 1 v. C.S. and Stuart McCarvel on May 11, 2020.
This argument will be heard remotely due to safety considerations related
to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Appellants, C.S. and Stuart McCarvel, in his
capacity as originator of the C.S. due process complaint, appeal the
decision of the United States District Court for the District of Montana.
This case originated in 2014 as a due process claim filed on behalf of C.S.
alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Appellee, Butte School District No. 1, seeks
affirmation of the decision of the district court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the district court as a challenge to an
administrative decision concerning whether Butte School District No. 1
(“District”) provided Petitioner, C.S., a free and appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”).1
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires the school
district to provide every student with a disability a free appropriate public
education.2 Every student with a disability, including students with severe
disabilities and challenging behaviors, are entitled to a FAPE under the
IDEA.3
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2009, C.S., now 26-years-old, enrolled in the District
to attend public school as a student “identified and educated as a child with
a disability under the IDEA.”4 C.S. experiences multiple, substantial
disabilities, including autism spectrum disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and specific learning disabilities (“SLD”).5 Together, these
1
In re Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. CV 14-60-BU-SEH, 2019 WL
343149, at *1 (D. Mont. Jan. 28, 2019), appeal filed sub nom. Butte School
Dist. No. 1, v. C.S., Et Al, Sep. 3, 2019, No. 2:14-CV-00060-SEH.
2
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. C.S. Et Al,
Sep. 3, 2019, No. 2:14-CV-00060-SEH.
3
Id.
4
In re Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2019 WL 343149, at *1.
5
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
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disabilities limit C.S.’s ability to learn, communicate, and regulate his
behaviors.6 Despite his average intelligence level, C.S.’s disabilities
hinder his ability to achieve and progress academically.7
C.S. reached the age of majority on March 9, 2012, at which time all
parental rights under the IDEA transferred to C.S. in accordance with 34
C.F.R. 300.520 and 34 C.F.R. 300.320(c).8 At this time, C.S. began living
with Petitioner Stuart McCarvel, C.S.’s direct service provider.9 Up until
this point, between 2009 and 2012, S.S., C.S.’s natural mother, had
“participated as his parent in the development of his individualized
education plan (“IEP”).”10 After C.S. reached the age of majority, S.S.
“ceased to have any role or participation in his education.”11
Beginning March 20, 2012, C.S. attended school sporadically and
was disenrolled by the District twice in the remainder of the 2011–2012
school year.12 At the beginning of the 2012–2013 academic year, C.S.’s
IEP team convened to develop an new IEP for C.S.’s senior year of high
school, but were unable to reach an agreement.13
On November 26, 2012, McCarvel filed a complaint with the Office
of Public Instruction (“OPI”) alleging violations of the IDEA.14 OPI
responded by directing the District to appoint a surrogate parent for the
educational purposes of C.S., pursuant to the IDEA.15 The District
appointed Mary Jo Mahoney as surrogate parent to represent C.S.’s
educational programming.16
Throughout the academic year, C.S. repeatedly voiced his desire to
graduate from school at the end of the year, despite the District’s offer of
compensatory education and an extended school year for C.S.17 Because
6

Id.
Id.
8
In re Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2019 WL 343149 at *1 (see 34 C.F.R. §
300.520 Transfer of Parental Rights at Age of Majority; and 34 C.F.R. §
300.320(c) Definition of Transfer of Rights at Age of Majority).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at *2.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. (relying on 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(b), which provides a “State must
establish procedures for appointing the parent of a child with a disability, or if
the parent is not available, another appropriate individual, to represent the
educational interests of the child throughout the period of the child’s
eligibility under Part B of the Act if, under State law, a child who has reached
the age of majority, but has not been determined to be incompetent, can be
determined not to have the ability to provide informed consent with respect to
the child’s educational program”).
16
Id.
17
Id.
7
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C.S. was an adult and had not been found incompetent or appointed a
guardian, his “decision to discontinue further school attendance was
accepted [and he] graduated in June 2013.”18
C.S. and McCarvel (petitioners/appellants) filed a due process
complaint with OPI on October 3, 2013, alleging procedural and
substantive violations of the IDEA by the District during the 2011-12 and
2012-13 academic years.19 Petitioners sought relief in the form of
“payment from the District for costs of compensatory education
services.”20 An administrative hearing was held and the hearing officer
concluded that the District “met the IDEA’s FAPE requirement in the
2012–13 school year, but had failed to provide a FAPE during the 2011–
12 school year.”21 The hearing officer ordered the District to provide C.S.
with compensatory educational services at the expense of the District.22
Separate complaints were filed challenging portions of hearing
officer’s decision and parties requested review by the district court.23 After
reviewing the record and finding error with petitioners’ expert witness
testimony, the district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held,
allowing the parties to submit additional testimony and evidence to
supplement the administrative record “in the interest of conducting an
independent and thorough review of the case before it.”24 An evidentiary
hearing was conducted in October 2018 addressing issues related to
whether the District failed to provide C.S. with a FAPE as required by the
IDEA for the 2011–12 and 2012–13 academic years. 25
The district court held a hearing on the merits of the parties’ crosscomplaints challenging the hearing officer’s administrative decision.26
The court reversed and vacated the hearing officer’s decision, finding that
the District provided C.S. with a FAPE for both academic years and that
the District met its procedural and substantive duties under the IDEA.27
The court dismissed all claims asserted by Petitioners and entered
judgment for the District.28 Petitioners appealed the court’s decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is set to hear oral argument on May
11, 2020.

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at *3.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at *1.
27
Id. at *17.
28
Id.
19
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The core question presented to the Court is whether the District
provided C.S. with a FAPE as required by the IDEA. The IDEA’s primary
goal is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them
a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and independent living.”29 A student’s IEP
is to be uniquely tailored to the needs of the student—“the centerpiece of
the IDEA’s educational delivery system.”30 In order to meet their
obligation to provide a student with a FAPE, school districts must comply
with both procedural and substantive requirements of the IDEA. 31
A.

Appellants’ Arguments

Appellants seek reversal of the district court’s decision on a number
of grounds regarding the District’s alleged failure of providing C.S. a
FAPE. Appellants allege the District: failed to evaluate C.S. in all areas of
suspected disability, identify C.S.’s SLD, and address C.S.’s SLD in his
IEPs; failed to conduct necessary behavioral assessments and design and
implement adequate behavioral programming for C.S.; failed to conduct
transition assessments required by the IEP and the IDEA’s mandatory
transition planning; and failed to allow Stewart McCarvel to exercise his
statutory parental rights.32 Additionally, appellants ask the Court to review
whether the “cumulative effect of the district court’s multiple erroneous
evidentiary and procedural rulings caused prejudice to C.S. and warrant
reversal.”33
Appellants allege that the district court erred in “failing to recognize
that the [District’s] failure to properly assess C.S. necessarily deprived
C.S. of FAPE.”34 Proper assessment and identification of a student’s
disability is necessary to understand the student’s individual
circumstances and tailor IEP goals and services to meet the student’s
needs.35 Appellants assert that the District did not “properly assess or
identify C.S.’s SLDs,”36 necessary for the delivery of FAPE.37
29

Id. at *4 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2018)).
Id. (citing Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311
(1988)).
31
Id.
32
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3–4.
33
Id. at 4.
34
Id. at 16–17.
35
Id. (citing Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d
1105, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2016)).
36
Id. at 16.
37
Id. at 17.
30
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Additionally, appellants argue that the court erred in failing to recognize
that the District designed fundamentally flawed behavior programs for
C.S. that inevitably deprived C.S. of FAPE.38
The district court held that the District’s failure to evaluate and
identify C.S.’s SLDs “did not impede the provision of FAPE or deprive
C.S. of educational benefit.”39 Appellants disagree. The IDEA requires
schools to assess students in “all areas related to the suspected disability,
using tools tailored to assess specific areas of educational need and
technically sound instruments that assess the relative contribution of
cognitive behavioral factors.”40 Appellants assert that the Ninth Circuit has
held “repeatedly and emphatically, [that] the provision of FAPE is
‘impossible’ when the IEP team fails to obtain ‘statutorily mandated’
evaluative information about the child’s disability and educational
needs.”41 Appellants point to Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified School
District, where the Ninth Circuit held that the failure to conduct an
evaluation in compliance with the IDEA is a “fundamental procedural
violation that ‘necessarily’ denies FAPE[,] …deprives the student of
educational opportunities and substantially hinders his parents’
participation in the process.”42
Appellants argue that the court erred in failing to recognize the
Districts failure in designing and delivering appropriate post-secondary
goals and transition services to meet C.S.’s individual needs, in
compliance with IDEA.43 The IDEA’s core purpose is to prepare students
for “further education, employment, and independent living.”44 Appellants
contend that the District failed to conduct age appropriate transition
assessments, develop appropriate measurable post-secondary goals, and
provide individualized transition services.45 Appellants assert that the
District’s failure to adhere to statutorily mandated requirements of
transition planning “is a substantial procedural violation that deprived C.S.
of educational opportunity, including the opportunity to progress in the
very post-secondary outcomes Congress stressed in the 2004 amendments
[to the IDEA].”46

38

Id.
Id. at 23.
40
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.304(b)(3),
(c)(2) and 300.304(c)(4)).
41
Id. at 24 (citing Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822
F.3d 1105, 1126 (9th Cir. 2019); Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty.
Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 894 (9th Cir. 2001)).
42
Id. (citing Timothy O., 822 F.3d at 1126 (emphasis original).
43
Id. at 17 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII)(aa–bb)).
44
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
45
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41–46.
46
Id. at 46.
39
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Appellants argue that the district court erred in two separate ways
regarding McCarvel’s right to full parental participation. First, appellants
argue that the court erred by failing to recognize that “excluding McCarvel
from C.S.’s IEP development process denied FAPE.”47 Because there
were concerns about C.S.’s ability to make informed decisions about his
educational programming, appellants assert that the District was required
to appoint McCarvel, not Mahoney, as C.S.’s educational decisionmaker.48 As C.S.’s foster parent, McCarvel should have been entitled to
“full parental participation in developing [C.S.’s] educational
programming and assessing its effectiveness.”49 Instead, however, Mary
Jo Mahoney was appointed as surrogate parent for C.S., “even though
Mahoney had no relationship with C.S. and had never met him.”50
Contrarily, McCarvel was actively involved in C.S.’s education.51
Secondly, appellants assert that the issue of McCarvel’s authority has
already been adjudicated by the Montana Supreme Court and Montana
Second Judicial District Court, but that the Federal District Court violated
28 U.S.C. § 1738 when it “did not afford those determinations full faith
and credit.”52 The Montana Supreme Court “determined McCarvel was
C.S.’s lawful parent for purposes of the IDEA and that [the District] had
been required to seek his appointment, not Mahoney’s.”53 Mahoney’s
appointment was vacated and McCarvel was appointed as C.S.’s
educational representative, retroactive to February 22, 2013.54 Appellants
argue that this error resulted in a “substantial procedural violation that
significantly impeded McCarvel’s opportunity to participate in the IEP
process, and thus, deprived C.S. of FAPE.”55
Lastly, appellants argue that the court committed a number of
procedural errors that prejudiced C.S. which, “standing alone, merit
reversal, [and therefore] taken cumulatively … compel reversal.”56
Appellants assert the following procedural errors by the court: 1)
conducting a hearing akin to a trial de novo, contrary to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal’s previous rulings; 2) wrongfully applying the Daubert
standard to an administrative hearing; and 3) improperly refusing valid
impeachment evidence and medical records under F. R. Evid. 607 and F.
R. Evid. 803(4).57 Appellants assert that IDEA “does not contemplate a
47

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 47.
49
Id. (citing School Committee of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept.
of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)); see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(A).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 16–17.
53
Id. at 48.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 50.
56
Id. at 18.
57
Id.
48
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trial de novo in district court,”58 and that “the source of the evidence
generally will be the administrative hearing record, with some
supplementation at trial.”59 Appellants argue that, over C.S.’s repeated
objections, the court erroneously allowed the Districts witnesses to “adopt
and reaffirm in all aspects their administrative testimony and testify in
greater detail,” effectively changing the character of the hearing from one
of review to a trial de novo.60
Appellants argue that the alleged failures by the District has led to
severe consequences for C.S., including delayed development of academic
and functional skills necessary for growth and learning and lost
opportunities to build upon skills he could have acquired had the District
provided a FAPE.61 Appellant’s argue that ultimately, the result of these
failures has put C.S. “further behind his peers and less prepared to function
as a self-sufficient, responsible adult in the community.” 62 As such,
appellants assert that the IDEA’s core purpose is not met, and seek reversal
of the court’s decision. 63
B.

Appellee’s Argument

In response, appellees argue that appellants’ contention of procedural
and substantive violations of the IDEA are not well founded.64 Appellees
base their argument on a number of evidentiary assertions based on the
record reviewed by the district court and ask the Ninth Circuit to affirm
the decision.65 Additionally, appellees argue that there are only three issues
for review as opposed to the appellants’ alleged five issues.
Appellees contend that the issues for review by the Court are: (1)
whether the district court properly found that the District provided C.S.
with a FAPE for both academic years; (2) whether the district court
properly found that the District met its procedural and substantive duties
under the IDEA; and (3) whether the district court’s rulings on evidence
offered by appellants constitute reversible error.66

58
Id. at 51 (citing Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 763 F.2d 773, 790 (1st
Cir. 1984)).
59
Id. (citing Burlington, 763 F.2d at 791).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 4–5, Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. C.S. Et
Al, Sep. 3, 2019, No. 2:14-CV-00060-SEH.
65
Id. at 4.
66
Id. at 3.
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First, appellees argue that appellants’ challenges to the court’s
decision are not supported by the evidence that was before the court.67
Appellees assert that “the most pervasive problem with C.S.’s numerous
assertions of error… is there is absolutely no documentary or reliable
factual evidence in the record to substantiate the assertions of error.”68 In
support of this, appellees argue that S.S. approved each component of
C.S.’s IEP used by the District to educate C.S., and that S.S. did not testify
at the administrative hearing or at the supplemental hearing.69
Accordingly, appellees assert that S.S. “did not lend any testimonial
support for any of the alleged IDEA deficiencies/violations … relied upon
by C.S.’s legal team.”70 Appellees further contend that McCarvel’s
testimony at the administrative hearing and the supplemental hearing did
not provide any support for appellants’ alleged IDEA deficiencies.71
Appellees argue that none of C.S.’s IEP team members testified that there
were deficiencies in the IEPs, execution of the IEPs, evaluations,
behavioral plans, goals, or transition plans implemented by the District.72
Rather, appellees assert that all alleged IDEA deficiencies were “only
raised by the testimony of the two expert witnesses C.S.’s legal team
retained.”73 Appellees conclude that the court appropriately based its
decision on “the documentary evidence and testimony of the fact
witnesses… and not on the testimony of the retained experts.”74
Appellees argue that the district court’s Order is fully supported by
the evidence.75 Appellees contend that, in his order, “the presiding judge
carefully analyzed the evidentiary record before the court… cited the
reader of the Memorandum and Order to evidence relied upon by the court,
and then articulated conclusions based entirely on the record established
at the administrative hearing and on the supplemental record.”76 As such,
appellees assert that the district court’s Order should be affirmed.
Appellees argue that the district court’s Order is entitled to deference
from the Ninth Circuit. Appellees assert that “the Appellate Court is
required to give due deference to the district court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law,” and that the Appellate Court is “not entitled to
reweigh the evidence presented at trial in an attempt to assess what items
should and should not have been accorded credibility.”77 Appellees
67

Id. at 5.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 6.
73
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 7.
77
Id. (citing Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 427 (9th Cir. 2015)).
68
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contend that an Appellate Court can only reverse a district court’s findings
if, “after a review of the entire record, the Appellate Court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”78
Appellees allege that all of the evidence establishes that the District
designed and implemented an educational program “reasonably calculated
to allow C.S. to make progress appropriate in light of C.S.’s
circumstances, as required by Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137
S. Ct. 988 (2017).”79
In response to appellants argument regarding McCarvel’s parental
participation, appellees assert that McCarvel’s non-appointment as C.S.’s
surrogate parent did not deny C.S. FAPE.80 Appellees base this argument
on the contention that there is “no evidence in the record tending to
establish that Mary Jo Mahoney adversely changed any of the School
District’s obligations to C.S.”81 Appellees also argue that the record
“actually reflects that Mr. McCarvel and C.S. were in attendance at all IEP
meetings held by the School District after Mary Jo Mahoney was
appointed surrogate.” 82 Appellees conclude that the evidence does not
establish a violation of IDEA by Mary Jo Mahoney’s appointment as
surrogate parent.83
Appellees argue that appellants’ objection to the court’s
supplementation of the record is unfounded.84 Appellees assert that “the
case law and the IDEA itself clearly authorize the supplementation of the
record at the discretion of the district court.”85 Appellees cite to Ojai
Unified Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1993), where the Court held
that the IDEA provides that “the court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request
of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”86 Appellees
construe “additional” to mean supplemental, and under the standard
adopted in Ojai, argue that the “determination… must be left to the
discretion of the trial court which must be careful not to allow such
evidence to change the character of the hearing from one of review to a
trial de novo.”87 Appellees conclude that the additional testimony from
their witnesses did not change the character of the district court proceeding
78

Id. (citing Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d 427).
Id. at 8.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 7–8.
83
Id. at 9.
84
Id. at 10.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing Ojai Unified Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471–72 (9th
Cir. 1993) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2))).
87
Id. (citing Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1472).
79
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from one of review to a trial de novo and that each witness’s testimony
was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.88
IV.

ANALYSIS

In light of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Endrew F., 89
this Court should find that the District denied C.S. a FAPE under the
heightened standard. The Court should strongly consider the Endrew F.
decision when reviewing this case.90 IDEA’s core purpose is that “all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.”91 IDEA disputes most commonly
arise between parents and education administrators over interpretation of
the definitions and requirements of IDEA’s provisions.
The United States Supreme Court raised the standard for schools to
meet their substantive obligations under the IDEA.92 The Supreme Court
made clear that schools must develop IEPs that are appropriately
ambitious in light of the child’s circumstances.93 The Supreme Court held
that the “IDEA requires an educational program reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances, and programs that provide merely some progress were not
adequate.”94 Endrew F. directs courts to consider the student’s ability to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances when
evaluating whether a school district has denied a student FAPE.95
The Supreme Court held that, in determining what it means to meet
the unique needs of a child with a disability, “the provisions governing the
IEP development process are a natural source of guidance: it is through
the IEP that the free appropriate public education required by the Act is
tailored to the unique needs of a particular child.”96 In addressing the
standard applied to a student’s educational programming goals, the
Supreme Court emphasized:
88

Id. at 11–14.
Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
90
See Id.
91
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
92
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 988.
93
Id. at 1000.
94
Brief of Amicus Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates,
Inc., at 5, Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. C.S. Et Al, Sep. 3, 2019, No. 2:14-CV00060-SEH (citing Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988, 1000 (2017)).
95
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
96
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
89
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Of course, this describes a general standard, not a formula. But whatever
else can be said about it, this standard is markedly more demanding than the
‘merely more than de minimus’ test applied by the Tenth Circuit… When all is
said and done, a student offered an educational program providing ‘merely more
than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been
offered an education at all. For children with disabilities, receiving instruction that
aims so low would be tantamount to ‘sitting idly… awaiting the time when they
were old enough to drop out.’ The IDEA demands more.97

The Supreme Court declined to elaborate on what “appropriate”
progress looks like but emphasized that “the adequacy of a given IEP turns
on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created.”98
C.S.’s educational experience was exactly what the Supreme Court
feared under the ‘merely more than de minimus’ standard—educational
instruction aimed so low that it could be considered tantamount to “sitting
idly… awaiting the time when [the student is] old enough to drop out.”99
At the outset, the District’s failure to fully assess and accurately identify
C.S.’s SLD resulted in a “fundamental defect in all of [the Districts] efforts
to educate C.S.”100 Although the District identified that C.S. experienced
constant, challenging behaviors which proved to “[substantially interfere]
with his learning and the learning of others,” 101 the District failed to design
an effective behavior intervention plan or conduct a proper functional
behavioral assessment, per IDEA requirements. 102 In light of Endrew F.,
the Court should find that the District failed to design an educational
program for C.S. that was specifically tailored to his unique needs, thus
violating IDEA’s core mandates.
V.

CONCLUSION

The IDEA’s primary goal is “to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living.”103 Based on a number of violations by the District,

97
Id. (citing Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist.,
Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982)) (internal
quotations omitted).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1000 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. 176).
100
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
101
Id. at 1–2.
102
Id. at 2.
103
In re Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. CV 14-60-BU-SEH, 2019 WL
343149, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 28, 2019) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)
(20018)).
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the Court should find that C.S. was not provided with a FAPE under the
IDEA.

